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Introduction
2 In  linguistics  verbs  that  indicate  the  necessary  beginning  of  an  action  are  called
inchoative verbs, based on the Latin term inchoãre – ‘to begin.’ They differ from durative
and resultative verbs that refer to the course and the result of an action respectively. In
German ‘brennen’ – (‘to burn’), for example, is the durative counterpart of the resultative
‘verbrennen’ (‘to burn up or combust’), and the inchoative ‘entbrennen’ (‘to burst into
flames’).  Based upon pragmatist  positions,  in this  paper I  would like to describe the
originality and peculiarity of the ethical  as an enabling of beginnings.  In doing so,  a
perspective  is  established  whereby  ethical  demands  can  neither  be  attributed  to
propositional  and  proposition-based  knowledge  nor  represented  by  a  norm,  as  all
knowledge and all norms confirm existing orders, define someone or something as being
such-and-such, and therefore have a tendency to inhibit new beginnings.
3 I  consciously refer to the ‘originality’ rather than the ‘autonomy’ of ethical claims in
order to emphasize the point that, while moral demands cannot be ascribed to God or
nature,  they  also  cannot  be  based  upon  human  positing  alone,  as  claimed by
conctractualism: they have no foundation in a pre-existing entity such as God or nature,
but they are still given in a fundamental sense, given in and with human practice. On the
one hand, practice is nothing other than what we make it, but on the other hand, we
cannot ever desist from or abandon practice, which makes it impossible to turn it entirely
into an object of theoretical contemplation.
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4 Aristotle once defined human practice as the activity of being with others through words
and deeds whose value is intrinsic. He describes practice as open and contingent. It is
characterized by the fact that in practice things could always be different or be started
over afresh. However, he limits practice to the polis as a stage for the encounter of free
and equal citizens and thus distinguishes it from other types of actions such as labour or
fabrication (poiesis) on the one hand, and the biological process of life in general on the
other.
5 In contrast to this approach, ever since Marx, we tend to conflate practice with life and
labour, and at the same time conceive it as something that is structured by underlying
patterns and norms: as an expression of the reproduction of objective conditions of its
possibility. Practice here inherits a necessity or causality that it in turn impresses itself
upon thinking. In order to suppress the creative and experimental spontaneity of practice
Marx  himself  exposed,  orthodox  Marxism  accentuates  a  certain  heaviness  and
irreducibility of practice that Aristotle limits to other types of activities as well as to the
biological process of life. For Aristotle, this spontaneity makes practice to the privileged
place for the emergence of new beginnings.  On the other hand it could be said that,
according to orthodox Marxism, the subject is always overpowered by a practice which
makes it impossible to start something new.
6 Meanwhile, pragmatism succeeds in combining both heaviness and lightness of practice
which is characterized as irreducible and indeterminate at the same time. Various kinds
of  pragmatist  ethics  criticize  the  assumption of  objective  structures  that  supposedly
determine practice and try to eliminate its spontaneity. The normative measure for this
kind of  criticism in  turn can be  nothing  other  than the  inchoative  openness  of  life
practice itself, the formula used by Peirce and Dewey that we should “not block the road
to inquiry” (Peirce 1931:  135).  The advantage of  this  normative measure is  that  it  is
conceptualized as entirely intra-mundane or naturalistic, but at the same time it does not
encourage ethical relativism.
7 In doing so, pragmatism sets itself apart not only from objectivistic approaches in social
philosophy,  but also from deontological  ethics in the tradition of  Kant.  According to
deontological  approaches,  practical  reason  is  a  representation  of  formal,  as  well  as
transcendental,  principles  that  serve  as  external  measures  for  criticizing  practical
actions. Deontological principle ethics thus tend to dictate particular forms of practice
and conform to their respective normative standards. It leaves no room for ruptures or
responsible decisions,  therefore does not  know any true beginnings.1 By contrast,  an
inchoative or pragmatist ethics would consider a practice as ethically justified only if it
resists the temptation to be subordinated under one single rule and the knowledge which
is embodied in this rule.
8 In the first section of my paper, I  will  try to show that the originality of the ethical
already for Plato and Kant cannot be represented as either propositional knowledge or a
norm, but is instead given to us in a way that is never fully in our rational grasp (1). In the
second section, I will address the ethical conclusions James and Dewey draw from the fact
that  ethical  demands  cannot  be  translated into  forms of  knowledge (2).  In  the  third
section,  I  conclude by arguing the originality  of  the ethical  based upon the work of
Stanley Cavell, stating that it is always something more than mere competence in the
sense of a knowledge of rules (3).
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Ethical Demands and Limits of Knowledge: From Plato
to Kant
9 At first glance, it may seem trivial to point out that the possibility of acting morally is
sub-ject to complex epistemic conditions. In order to act morally, we require knowledge
regarding, for example, the coordinates of the situation we are about to participate in,
the  potential  consequences  of  our  action,  the  conflicting  claims  of  other  actors,  the
normative  measures  that  may  provide  orientation  to  our  actions,  as  well  as  the
procedures that can ideally justify these measures. There is no denying that knowledge is
relevant  for  moral  action.  Nevertheless,  from  a  pragmatic  perspective  the  question
remains as to whether knowledge is a sufficient and appropriate condition for virtue, if,
in other words,  the originality of  the ethical  is  explicable as a form of propositional
knowledge.
10 Currently, on the level of justification as well as the application of ethics, a rationalist
prejudice prevails that correct and well-founded knowledge will automatically lead to
what is right, in other words: moral and practical validity claims depend upon epistemic
validity  claims.  This  ethical  intellectualism  has  a  prominent  historical  predecessor,
Socrates, whose position Bruno Snell recapitulates as follows: 
I think it is possible to indicate the origin of Socrates’ discussion of morals: The
Medea of Euripides says: “I know what evil  I  am about to do, but my passion is
stronger.” Socrates counters: “If only one knows what is good, one will also do good
– it is merely a question of genuinely realizing what is good. Nobody is voluntarily
doing evil.” (Snell 1955: 248)
11 Socrates at first glance seems to be an ethical intellectualist. According to him, we should
strive for eudaimonia, a ‘good life’ that, as soon as we know what it is, we will want to live
it. Above all, this ‘good life’ would be the life of a man guided by his pursuit of knowledge.
Apology 28a  further  explains  that  well-founded  knowledge  is  achieved  by  constantly
“questioning  one  self  and  others,”  that  is,  questioning  the  possible  justification  for
different  opinions.  Socrates  is  well  aware  that  theoretical  knowledge  alone  cannot
provide a sufficient and appropriate motivation for our ethical actions: Knowledge has to
be complemented by virtue or by a person’s character, their areté, which is characterized
as the ability to do well. But, according to Socrates, this areté in turn depends upon a
knowledge that acts as a condition of its possibility. In Laches (199d) and Charmides (174c),
Socrates talks about “knowledge of good and evil” as a condition for areté (compare Hardy
2010). Ignorance is explicitly considered to be the greatest sin.
12 Is Socrates, therefore, an ethical intellectualist (as, for example, claimed by Hardy 2010:
149-191)? Doubts are in order here, mainly deriving from what knowledge of the good
could actually mean from Plato’s perspective. In Philebos Plato transfers the good into a
sphere “beyond being and essence” and, herein following Anaximander, characterizes it
as ápeiron, infinite and indeterminate (compare Philebos 28a). It is not part of the sphere of
logon  didonei and  thus  calls  for  another  capacity  –  nous  – which  does  not  aim  at
propositional knowledge, but a pre-reflective one that cannot be justified, but is at best
presupposed and plays an irritating, rather than a guiding, role in all our relations with
the world.
13 This scepticism as to whether the good is a form of knowledge is already hinted at in the
early dialogue Meno. In this dialogue, Socrates doubts the ability to teach virtue with the
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argument that virtue is of a completely different kind than propositional knowledge and
represents a realm that has a validity of its own. Plato is the origin of two different
traditions: a) an intellectualist tradition stating that when it comes to our ethical actions
we are orientated by a model, a theoretical ideal form (eidos) which we realize as a telos in
our  ethical  actions,  and b)  a  tradition emphasizing the irreducible  originality  of  the
ethical  that  precedes  any  knowledge  and  positively  suspends  existing  regimes  of
knowledge.
14 Analogous to John L. Austin’s notion of descriptive fallacy in the language philosophy of
logical positivism, I would like to characterize the rationalist assumption that on the one
hand  it  is  possible  to  achieve  knowledge  which  is  relevant  to  action  in  any  given
situation,  and that  on the  other  this  knowledge  provides  us  with  immediate  ethical
motivation is an intellectual fallacy: the meaning of ethical claims cannot be reduced to a
propositional and proposition-based knowledge. This does not answer the question as to
whether the ethical could be based on a different, non-propositional kind of knowledge,
for example, a genuinely practical knowledge as outlined in the Aristotelian notion of
phronesis. But at this point I will not pursue that question any further, as any definition of
practical  knowledge already has to include a certain knowledge of  the practical,  the
possibility of which is precisely what is up for debate here.
15 Like  Plato’s  philosophy,  Kant’s  philosophy  also  seems  to  oppose  a  simple  ethical
rationalism or intellectualism. Contrary to what is often assumed, the highest point of
Kant’s moral philosophy is not knowledge of the law (or rather the very form of the law),
but the sentiment of ‘respect’ (‘Achtung’) that we not only owe the law, but the other
person too. This sentiment, which Kant refers to with “you ought,” is not identical with
the law, but is at best reflected in it. For Derrida, it is the paradox of Kantian ethics that
the sentiment of respect 
[…] inscribes in the heart of a morality incapable of giving an account of being
inscribed in an affect or in a sensibility of what should not be inscribed there or
should only enjoin the sacrifice of everything that would only obey this sensible
inclination. (Derrida 1995b: 31)
16 More than anything else, Kant’s repeated hint at the “fact of reason” (cf. Kant 2002b: 46),
something that is given and underlies all morality, is a clue that the originality of ethics
amounts to something more than simply the formal shape of the law of morality. Kant’s
remark that morality can be neither “searched for” nor “invented” (cf. Kant 2002b: 133),
but only presupposed goes in this same direction. To explain Kant in Ernesto Laclau’s
words: “There is an ethical investment in particular normative orders, but no normative
order which is,  in and for itself,  ethical” (Laclau 2000:  81).  The ethical  can never be
identical to any normative order, because all norms are made by man, remain contingent,
and are not able to cover all aspects of the ethical. So the ethical is a empty signifier: “It
is, to use Kant’s term, a noumenon, an object which shows itself through the impossibility
of its adequate representation” (Laclau 2002: 3). Contrary to the normative order, the
ethical is 
[…]  related  to  the  experience  of  the  unconditional  in  an  entirely  conditioned
universe. And this experience of the unconditional is the kernel of any notion of
ethics. (Laclau 2002: 3)
17 In  my  opinion,  Kant,  like  Plato,  alternates  between ethical  intellectualism and  anti-
intellectualism. He remains intellectualist in his assumption that we are able to know the
foundation of ethical actions – the law of morality – without any mediation: “But if I think
of a categorical imperative, then I know [since I myself am the author of this imperative]
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directly what it  contains” (Kant 2002a:  37).  Here the motive of  doing well  (the good
intention) weighs more than the consequences of an action. Kant states that man remains
“inexperienced in regard to the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all
the occurrences that might eventuate in it” (Kant 2002a: 19), which is why ethics cannot
be  justified  from  a  solely  consequentialist  perspective.  But  at  the  same  time,  Kant
underlines that, on the level of intention, something runs counter to knowledge: 
In fact even through the most strenuous testing, we can never fully get behind the
covert  incentives,  because  when we are  talking about  moral  worth,  it  does  not
depend on the actions, which one sees, but on the inner principles, which one does
not see. (Kant 2002a: 23)
18 Such an incitement for Kant is most notably freedom, which in turn is nothing other than
the  capacity  to  begin.  In  reference  to  this  central  principle  of  practical  reason,  he
remarks that it is the only idea “whose possibility we know a priori – though without
having insight into it” (Kant 2002b: 5). Only as an expression of freedom can the law of
morality be considered as “absolutely great” (a phrase which Kant constantly uses to
allude to the Platonic apeiron). I can never know of freedom as freedom, as any knowledge
already requires freedom. Seeing that, Kant towards the end of his Groundwork comes up
with an outright negativist resumé of his ethics: 
And thus we indeed do not comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of
the moral imperative, but we do comprehend its incomprehensibility. (Kant 2002a:
79)
19 If I had to conceptually place the position only hinted at in this brief comments on Plato
and Kant in the current meta-ethical debate (see Horster 2012), I would say that I share
the premise of ethical realists such as McDowell, Nagel, or Putnam that moral facts, for
instance claims and demands, have an autonomous existence regardless of us. I disagree
with them, however, insofar as I do not consider moral sentences to be truth-apt. Rather,
they raise a different kind of validity claim which is why the task of moral philosophy is
not the adequate representation of moral facts. I agree with a certain non-cognitivism in
non- or anti-realistic positions as represented, for example, by Ayer, Stevenson, Mackie,
Hare, or Blackburn. Moral judgements are not representations of moral facts; but I part
with  anti-realism in  thinking  that  they  certainly  do  depend upon independent  facts
(claims, an ‘ought to’).
20 To me,  the  pragmatist  notion of  practice  seems to  mark the  corresponding position
between ethical realism and anti-realism: Moral facts exist regardless of us in that they
are part of a practice that is given and cannot be abandoned by simply reflecting our way
out of it. At the same time, those facts do not have a status that allows us to know them or
represent them in any way. However, this does not mean that they amount to nothing
more than simple preferences, as claimed by many of the non-realists.
 
Ethics as Practice: From James to Dewey
21 In case an intellectualist tradition of ethics should succeed in deducing practical validity
claims from theoretical  validity  claims,  the  question of  justifying ethical  judgements
would appear to be a special case of the question of justified theoretical convictions.
Conversely,  this  would  imply  that  insufficiently  founded  knowledge  claims  are  also
problematic  with  respect  to  ethics.  William  Clifford  confronted  early  American
Pragmatism with precisely this criticism in his 1885 essay Ethics of  Belief. Against this
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backdrop, William James’ answer, The Will to Belief (1897), can be read as an attempt to
rescue the originality of the ethical.  With The Will  to Belief,  James works towards two
different aims. On the one hand, he pursues a “justification of faith” (James 1956: 1), of
belief in the sense of a hypothesis in the realm of the life-world, while on the other he
seeks to show that certain practical contexts allow a “justification by faith” (James 1956:
1),  that  is  through convictions that  are not  entirely justifiable.  James strives  for  the
rehabilitation of belief and in this context highlights the fact that human practice is only
able to be rationalized to a certain degree. He points out that we always already hold
beliefs in our everyday life, such as “in molecules and the conservation of energy, in
democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity” (James 1956: 9) and so on –
without being able to state “reasons worthy of the name” (James 1956: 9).
22 James  can  here  refer  to  Aristotle,  who  describes  practice  as  a  realm  of  irreducible
contingency where things could always just as well be completely different. Ethics and
politics as sciences of practice exclusively refer to “subjects” which 
[…] seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not
have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who
takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation. (Arist. Rhet. 1357a)
23 This conclusion,  which is hard to accept for rationalists and scientists,  does not lead
James into an abstinence from judging altogether as is typical of radical scepticism, or
even  into  irrationalism.  Understanding  that  there  are  no  ultimate  reasons  behind
practice in fact compels pragmatism to attempt a justification of practice through the
absence of ultimate foundations or through its performativity.  Paraphrasing James, it
could be said that practice involves an uncovered faith in an option that will only be
justifiable in retrospect: 
There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith
exits in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an
insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the
‘lowest kind of immorality’ into which a thinking being can fall.  Yet such is the
logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives! (James 1956:
25)
24 While  Clifford  insinuates  an ethics  that  seeks  to  anchor  convictions  in  well-founded
knowledge,  James  elaborates  a  certain  inevitability  of  unfounded  convictions.  For
Clifford, only a conviction that is scientifically founded, or at least founded in a way
analogous  to  science,  could  count  as  justified.  He  illustrates  the  assumed  moral
consequences of pragmatism with the example of a ship owner that allows a ship full of
emigrants to sail even though he is aware that it is old and ramshackle and therefore is in
danger of capsizing. The example implies that the ship owner holds a diffuse belief that
things will go well, just as they have done many times before. Clifford uses this diffuse
belief as a paradigm for poorly founded convictions, ‘doxa’ in contrast to ‘episteme,’ and
thus critiques James’ belief. But is his example not, first of all, an example of something
else entirely? Namely, that in spite of having well-founded knowledge of something, we
still  do not act according to this knowledge? Which makes it rather an example that
refutes the intellectualist assumption of rationalist ethics that well-founded knowledge
automatically leads into doing what is right.
25 In  contrast,  James  brings  into  play  a  completely  different  dimension.  A  conviction
becomes a living option only if I can accept responsibility for its consequences, regardless
of how well or poorly founded it is. But I can only meaningfully accept responsibility for
something the consequences of which are not yet certain. In the same manner, it is one of
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the conditions of making a promise that I can only meaningfully promise what would not
have happened in the course of events anyway. For James, the impossibility of basing
practice  entirely  upon knowledge  is  the  condition  of possibility of  accepting  ethical
responsibility. James characterizes Clifford’s position as follows: “Better risk loss of truth
than chance of error” (James 1956: 26). In contrast, I can only act ethically where I am
exposed to the risks of error and failure. Otherwise, I  would not be acting at all,  but
merely operating or carrying out a calculus. Against the backdrop of these thoughts, in
his decidedly moral philosophical writings James assumes a post-conventional position,
that is, we are not acting ethically if we simply subject our actions to rules, but only if we
also come to realize that no rule can ever claim that it was the single adequate rule for
the case in question: “The highest ethical life [...] consist at all times in the breaking of
rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case” (James 1956: 209). It is not the
task of ethics to come up with universal solutions, but to strive for justice in every single
and particular case: “For every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation”
(James 1956: 209). Ethics thus turns into an endless and always self-referential task. At the
beginning of his essay The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life, James points out that the
definite  shape  of  ethics  can  only  be  determined:  “until  the  last  man  has  had  his
experience and said his say” (James 1956: 184).
26 With this plea for the moral significance of ignorance, James does not mean to imply that
knowledge and rules should not play a role in ethical decision-making. As a philosopher
with a  high affinity  for  science,  like  Clifford,  James rejects  any resignation to  wilful
ignorance. What he does decline, however, is the idea that, when it comes to practice, it is
possible to achieve exhaustive knowledge of it and that an entirely justified knowledge is
indispensable  as  the  foundation  for  an  ethically  acceptable  action.  With  respect  to
knowledge and ignorance, we find ourselves in an aporetic situation that Derrida explains
as follows: 
Saying that a responsible decision must be taken on the basis of knowledge seems
to define the condition of possibility of responsibility (one can’t make a responsible
decision without science or conscience,  without knowing what one is  doing,  for
what reasons [...]), at the same time as it defines the condition of impossibility of
this same responsibility (if decision-making is relegated to a knowledge that it is
content to follow [...], then it is no more a responsible decision. (Derrida 1995a, 24)
27 This aporia cannot be resolved on a theoretical level – at best we can live it.
28 In his Ethics, published in 1908 in co-authorship with James Hayden Tufts and republished
in  1932  in  a  heavily  revised  second  edition,  Dewey  takes  up  James’s  agenda  of  a
pragmatist  ethics.  But  the  naturalistic  foundation  for  his  ethics  had  already  been
established in 1896 with his essay The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology (EW 5: 96-109), where
he develops  a  theory of  experience that  claims validity  for  theoretical  and practical
experiences alike. This theory of experience unfolds in five steps (see Edel, Flower 1985:
X): (1) the initial point of every experience is a life crisis or a situation that has became
problematic and stimulates a process of inquiry; (2) this process of inquiry is a practical
process, that is to say, a practice; (3) the process is at the same time reconstructive and
experimental, it involves innovations (new beginnings) concerning the assessment of the
situation and the search for solutions respectively;  (4) the process (or practice) has a
temporal structure and reflects upon its own temporality, and (5) the whole process must
be conceived in a holistic way. Intentions, experiences, consequences of actions, as well as
the self, are dimensions of the process or practice rather than self-contained elements.
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29 The first conclusion that Dewey draws from the experimentalist starting point of his
ethics is a departure from universal moral principles. The project of a “moral inquiry”
seeks for specific answers to specific problems in specific contexts, rather than for what is
good for everyone at all  times.  For Dewey, ethics does not establish general forms or
patterns of conduct, but understands itself as a reflection. It does not see itself as referring to
reason as an underlying principle,  but to intelligence as  a situational  and,  above all,  a
practical  capacity.  In the preface to the 1932 edition of  Ethics, the editors accurately
remark that “reason is low keyed” (Edel & Flower 1985: XXIII) in Dewey’s ethics, and,
furthermore, that “the work of analysis has to be done in each case” (Edel & Flower 1985:
XXXIII). It cannot resort to any pre-existing or extra-practical orientations. What counts
as an ethically adequate answer to a situation – Dewey herein follows James – has to be
explored afresh in every new situation, while sticking to eternal values and norms brings
about a tendency to not even realize the newness of a situation. For Dewey, a practice
that  is  different  every  time and based upon beginnings  is  the  source of  any ethical
orientation.  It  precedes  us,  but  does  not  determine  us  and  is  not  itself  externally
determined. Practice confronts us with an ever-changing ‘ought-to’ that can be conceived
as  given,  but  at  the  same  time  cannot  be  characterized  in  terms  of  propositional
knowledge. 
30 Just as practice mediates between is and ought, it also mediates between society and the
individual. In his 1920 essay Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey writes: 
Just as “individual” is not one thing, but is a blanket term for the immense variety
of  specific  reactions,  habits,  dispositions  and powers  of  human nature  that  are
evoked, and confirmed under the influences of associated life,  so with the term
“social.” Society is one word, but infinitely many things. (MW 12: 194)
31 Based upon the pragmatist notion of practice, the individual as well as the social appear
as empty signifiers or abstractions, which is why ethics according to Dewey does not have
to choose between defending the demands of the individual or the demands of society as
such. In times of social petrification and conformism, ethics defends the perspective of
the individual. Whereas in times of constant upheaval and individualism, ethics is more
likely to defend the demands of the community. But in the end both sides are no more
than abstractions of one and the same practice. The same goes for other antagonistic
conceptual dualisms within the tradition of ethics, as, for example, motives of actions (as
the pivotal point of deontological principle ethics), and consequences of actions (upon
which utilitarianism bases ethical actions).  For Dewey, both terms are always already
“embodied in action” (LW 7: 173): will is nothing more than a tendency towards certain
consequences, while consequence is nothing more than the realization of a will.
32 Ethics in general is affected by this anti-dualism in that Dewey conceives it as a practice
rather than as a moral theory: 
No fundamental  difference  exists  between systematic  moral  theory  [...]  and the
reflection an individual  engages in when he attempts to find general  principles
which shall direct and justify his conduct. (LW 7: 163)
33 Accordingly, moral reflection for Dewey offers no theory or meta-language of practice,
but is just another shape of practice itself. It can never definitely resolve a crisis, never
definitely judge an action or person by means of a norm. The primal scene of ethics for
Dewey does not consist in the conflict between a norm and a temptation to violate it, but
in a conflict between equal norms. Ethics 
Ethics, Knowledge, and Rule-Following
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
8
[…] does not offer a table of commandments in a catechism in which answers are as
definite as are the questions which are asked. It can render personal choice more
intelligent, but it cannot take the place of personal decisions, which must be made
in every case of moral perplexity. (LW 7: 166)
34 Ethics itself cannot make a decision. Rather, it keeps open the space for decision. This in
turn is only possible if the situation the actor refers to is not completely determined, but
haunted by an irreducible ignorance: 
Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and
what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges when men are
confronted with situations in which different desires promise opposed goods and in
which incompatible  courses  of  action seem to  be  morally  justified.  Only  such a
conflict  of  good ends and of standards and rules of  right and wrong calls  forth
personal inquiry into the basis of morals. (LW 7: 164) 
35 The  condition  of  ethical  inquiry  or ethical  practice  for  Dewey  is  an  antinomy:  the
impossibility  of  resolving  a  conflict  between two  ethical  demands  on  the  basis  of  a
preceding knowledge.
 
Why can Knowledge not be a Sufficient Basis for
Morality? Stanley Cavell’s Answer
36 Possibly the most insightful reflection of the question as to “whether, or to what extent,
knowledge can provide a basis for morality” (Cavell  1999:  248) has been provided by
Stanley  Cavell  in  his  1979  monograph  The  Claim  of  Reason. Here  he  turns  against  a
conception of  ethics  “by  which we  undertake  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge,  or  ‘rational
conviction,’  as  to  what  ought  to  be  done”  (Cavell  1999:  247)  and  by  which  we
conceptualize this knowledge as a knowledge of rules that are relevant to action.
37 The theoretical programme Cavell pursues could be summed up as an interpretation of
Wittgenstein that acknowledges the priority of the figure of the other on the level of
theoretical philosophy. He interprets the central sections of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations as  the theory of  meaning-as-use,  the private  language argument or  the
discussion of the problem of the other’s mind from the perspective of alterity theory.
According  to  Cavell, for  Wittgenstein,  compliance  with  rules  thus  the  possibility  of
speaking  and  acting  depends  upon  the  perspective  of  another,  who  is  beyond  my
cognitive grasp. This other I cannot recognize, but at best respect.
38 As  opposed  to,  for  example,  Paul  Ricœur  or  Axel  Honneth,  the  relation  between
recognition  and  respect  from  Cavell’s  perspective  is  not  a  continuous  transition:
“Acknowledgment goes beyond knowledge” (Cavell 1976: 257). He asks whether respect
requires  knowledge  of  the  Other  or  if,  rather,  it  does  not  require  a  suspension  of
knowledge in order to respect the Other precisely in his or her alterity.  If  respect is
reduced to a recognition of attributes and capacities, it runs the risk of extending social
exclusions. Thus Cavell criticizes even the humanistic demand to respect those who are
excluded or have no part: The intention of humanism 
[…] is  to acknowledge the outcast as a human being; but his effect is  to treat a
human being as an outcast, as if the condition of outcastness defined a social role, a
kind of sub-profession, suited for a certain kind of human being. So it  is  apt to
perpetuate the guilt it means to assuage. (Cavell 1999: 437)
39 There is only one way to escape this dilemma: 
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to accept my exposure in the case of others seems to imply an acceptance of the
possibility that my knowledge of others may be overthrown, even that it ought to
be. (Cavell 1999: 439)
40 Cavell’s endeavour to limit the relevance of knowledge to the development of the moral
point of  view particularly concerns the relation of  ethical  action and compliance with
rules.  From his  perspective,  modernity  tends  to  define  ethics  as  ethical  expertise, as
knowledge  of  rules.  With  Wittgenstein,  he  points  out  a  kind  of  indeterminateness
between a rule and the practice that is to be ruled. In his thoughts on the ability to teach
mathematics, the competent continuation of number series, the later Wittgenstein points
out that it is possible to specify more than one rule for every number series. This in turn
means that every series can be adequately continued in more than one way. If the maths
teacher acts on the assumption of a single commonly used rule that may even appear to
be the only possible rule, he runs the risk of excluding a student who continues the series
differently than expected. From this perspective, I become “morally competent” (Cavell
1999: 267) only if I am able to acknowledge the relevance of the doubts others might have
concerning my rule.
41 In this context, Cavell strives for a “moralization of moral theory” (Cavell 1999: 269):
“Morality must leave itself open to repudiation” (Cavell 1999: 269). In practice, this means
that the questions as to “what will be making it a moral issue, what kinds of reasons,
entered in what way, to what effect, will be moral reasons” (Cavell 1999: 289) and who
counts as a moral agent or patient in which context, are considered moral questions. It has
been pointed  out,  especially  by  the  modern critique  of  morality  as  represented,  for
example,  by  Marx,  Nietzsche,  and  Freud,  that  it  is  crucial  to  integrate  this  point
consistently into the moral discourse. In a similar vein, Derrida, who has taken up this
moral critical line of thought, considers the key questions of ethics to be: “What is the
ethicity  of  ethics?  The  morality  of  moral?  What  is  responsibility?.”  For  him,  those
questions to a certain extent must remain: 
unanswered, at any rate without a general and rule-governed response, without a
response other than that which is linked specifically each time, to the occurrence of
a  decision  without  rules  and  without  will  in  the  course  of  a  new  test  of  the
undecidable. (Derrida 1995b: 16ff.)
42 Taking up a Searlean distinction, it could be said that, for Cavell, rules in moral contexts
play an at best regulative, but never a constitutive role: 
No  rule  or  principle  could  function  in  a  moral  context  the  way  regulatory  or
defining rules function in games. It is as essential to the form of life called morality
that rules so conceived be absent as it is essential to the form of life we call playing
a game that they be present. (Cavell 1999: 307)
43 When  it  comes  to  ethics,  the  reference  to  rules  is  always  belated,  as,  rather  than
explaining what we ought to do, these rules can only be understood as a function of an
‘ought’: “For rules are themselves binding only subject to our commitment” (Cavell 1999:
307).  This ‘ought’  contains an indeterminateness:  “‘Ought,’  unlike ‘must,’  implies that
there is an alternative course you may take, may take responsibility for” (Cavell 1999:
498). In contrast, the rules of a game imply a must. They exclude alternatives. Within the
game, we become inhabitants of a realm of necessity, whereas in morality we are free to
relate to the laws this way or another way. In Robert Brandom’s words: 
The rules do not immediately compel us, as natural ones do. Their compulsion is
rather mediated by our attitude towards those rules. What makes us act as we do is
not the rule or norm itself but our acknowledgement of it. (Brandom 1994: 31)
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44 For Cavell, moral arguments: “may always break down” (Cavell 1999: 255). Indeed, it is
precisely this possibility (which is at the same time the possibility of future) that defines
them as moral arguments. The fact “that moral disagreements are not to be settled the
way disagreements about logical or factual matters are” (Cavell 1999: 260) does not mean
that,  from  Cavell’s  perspective,  moral  questions  are  more  irrational  than  factual
questions. Rather, their precarious state is due to a certain self-reflectiveness of morality.
A moral situation for Cavell is not one of blind rule application, but, as for James, a post-
conventional and creative one in which we remain in doubt over the rule to be applied, as
well as the interpretation of the case to be ruled: 
Apparently, what the ‘case’ in question is forms part of the content of the moral
argument itself. Actions, unlike envelopes and goldfinches, do not come named for
assessment, nor, like apples, ripe for grading. The most serious sense, to my mind,
in which Kant’s moral theory is ‘formalistic’ comes not from his having said that
actions motivated only in certain ways are moral actions but in his having found
too little difficulty in saying what ‘the’ maxim of an action is in terms of which his
test of its morality, the Categorical Imperative, is to be applied. (Cavell 1999: 265) 
45 Cavell accentuates the moral relevance of the question of how an action can be described
and recognized as morally significant. Intellectualist ethics ignore the fact “that there is
this problem about how an action is to be described” (Cavell 1999: 265), that whatever
description of an action we come up with, the motives of action and another’s person’s
guiding rules o run the risk of what Adorno could call: “false projection.”
46 To sum up, James, Dewey, and Cavell remain loyal to the Kantian agenda of pointing out
limits of knowledge in order to concede to ethics a realm that has a validity of its own.
Based on pragmatism, we should strive for as much knowledge as possible, all the more so
in situations in which ethical decisions are at stake, but at the same time reflect upon the
limits of what we can possibly know, that is, on the things we do not yet know, but should
know in order to make responsible decisions here and now, and above all, on the things
we might never be capable of knowing as a matter of principle. From this perspective,
ethics is not a form of knowledge, but a way of critically and creatively dealing with
knowledge that must never run out.
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1. The etymology of inchoo seems to point towards the Greek ‘εγχαράσσω,’ ‘make an incision, slit
something open’ (compare Georges 1910, vol. 2, 145).
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ABSTRACTS
Starting from a pragmatist point of view the paper dismisses the argument that ethical conduct
is always based on knowledge of justifying and applying rules. In a first section I show that Plato
and  Kant  already  claimed  that  the  originality  of  the  ethical  can’t  be  represented  as  either
propositional  knowledge  or  a  norm,  but  is  instead  given to  us  in  a  way  that  is  never  fully
available for our rational grasp. In a second section, I will address the ethical conclusions James
and Dewey draw from the fact that ethical demands can’t be translated into forms of knowledge.
In a third section, I conclude with an argument for the originality of the ethical based on the
thoughts of Stanley Cavell, stating that it is always something more than a mere competence in
the sense of a knowledge of rules.
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